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I COMMENTSI
Cultural Conflicts in Court: Should the
American Criminal Justice System
Formally Recognize A "Cultural
Defense"?
I. Introduction
The United States has always been considered a nation where
immigrants are embraced wholeheartedly into the framework of the
culture.' However, what happens when those immigrants follow the
traditions, values, and norms of their own cultures to the extent that it
conflicts with those of their adopted homeland?2 An inevitable legal
clash of cultures arises through which innovative attorneys recently have
been attempting to forge new paths in criminal defense using the defense
of "culture." 3
Several cases illustrate the consequences of this cultural collision.
For example, in 1985, a young Japanese woman, upon hearing of her
husband's infidelity, carried her two young children into the sea." The
children drowned, but the woman was saved and placed on trial for
murder The woman claimed she had been practicing oyako-shinju,6
or parent-child suicide, a custom that is accepted and even honored in
1. John C. Lyman, Cultural Defense: Viable Doctrine or Wishful Thinking?, 9 CRIM. JUST.
J. 87 (1986).
2. Id. at 87; see also Mark Thompson, The Cultural Defense, 14 STUDENT LAW. 25 (1985).
3. Spencer Sherman, Legal Clash of Cultures, NAT'L L.J., August 5, 1985, at 1.
4. People v. Kimura, No. A-091133 (Santa Monica Super. Ct. Nov. 21, 1985). See Michael
Reese, A Tragedy in Santa Monica, NEWSWEEK, May 6, 1985, at 10.
5. Leslie Pound, Mother's Tragic Crime Exposes A Culture Gap, CHI. TRIB., June 10, 1985,
at Cl.
6. Sherman, supra, note 3, at 1.
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Japan. 7 Likewise, in Fresno, a Laotian man of the Hmong tribe
abducted a coed at Fresno State University in the ritual of "marriage by
capture" practiced in his culture.' He took her to his home and
consummated the "marriage." Later, the woman pressed charges for
rape. I I
In a related case, a man raised in Oaxaca, Mexico became
intoxicated and nearly decapitated his friend with a machete.' 2  He
claimed he did not understand the differences between his country's legal
system and that in the United States.' 3 Similarly, in 1989, a Chinese
man, upon discovering his wife's infidelity, took a claw hammer and hit
his wife five times over the head, killing her. 4 The judge allowed
evidence of the Chinese culture into testimony, and the defendant was
given the lightest possible sentence for second degree manslaughter."
In Oregon, three Native Americans of the Siletz tribe murdered a
man whom they thought had been desecrating their ancient burial ground
and unearthing ancient artifacts. 6 Finally, in San Francisco, a Native
American killed a Caucasian police officer claiming that he had been
raised to fear Caucasians because of his cultural background.' 7 His
defense was that of self-defense, a defense which was closely tied to
culture. '
7. For a discussion regarding the propriety and traditions of oyako-shinju, see Taimie Bryant,
"Oyako-Shinju": Death at the Center of the Heart, 8 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 1 (1990).
8. The tribal custom practiced by the Hmong tribesmen is called zi poj niam. See Joel
Simon, From Laos to California, NAT'L L.J., June 25, 1990, at 8.
9. People v. Moua, No. 315972-0 (Fresno County Super. Ct. Feb. 7, 1985). See also Myrna
Oliver, Immigrant Crimes; Cultural Defense-A Legal Tactic, L.A. TIMES, July 15, 1988, at 1.
10. Rorie Sherman, Cultural Defenses Draw Fire; Double Standard?, NAT'L L.J., April 17,
1989, at 3, 28.
11. Oliver, supra note 9, at 8.
12. Joel Simon, U.S., Mexican Cultures Clash in California, NAT'L L.J., June 25, 1990, at
8. Under the Mexican moral system based on collective well-being and reciprocal relations, the
defendant was morally obligated to accept the victim's invitation to drink. Because the fight took
place while he was fulfilling a social obligation, he is less responsible for his actions than if he were
sober. Id.
13. Id.
14. People v. Chen, No. 87-7774 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 21, 1989). See Patricia Hurtado,
Killer's Sentence Defended: 'He's Not a Loose Cannon', NEWSDAY, April 4, 1989, at 3.
15. Alexis Jetter, Fear is Legacy of Wife Killing in Chinatown; Battered Asians Shocked by
Husband's Probation, NEWSDAY, November 26, 1989, at 4.
16. State v. Butler, No. 44496 (Lincoln County Cir. Ct. filed Mar. 11, 1981). See Sherman,
supra note 3, at 1.
17. People v. Croy, No. 52587 (Placer County Super. Ct. Apr. 1990). See David Talbot, The
Ballad of Hooty Croy; 'True Believer' Attorney Tony Serra Fights his Own Version of the Indian
Wars-In a Courtroom, L.A. TIMES, June 24, 1990, at 16.
18. Defense attorney J. Tony Serra, of San Francisco, claimed that Croy fired his gun in a
good faith belief of imminent harm. He stated to the jury, "Citizens, ordinary citizens, can defend
CULTURAL DEFENSE
All of these cases share a common feature. In each, the defendants
asserted that their cultural background properly negated the intent
required to be held responsible for committing a crime. 9 While the
United States has yet to recognize a formalized "cultural defense, " 20 an
operative statement would read as follows: "A cultural defense will
negate or mitigate criminal responsibility where acts are committed under
a reasonable, good-faith belief in their propriety, based upon the actor's
cultural heritage or tradition." 2' Thus, the cultural defense would
operate to either obviate or mitigate criminal responsibility.
However, the debate rages on both sides of the cultural fence. The
proponents for recognizing a formalized cultural defense' assert that
two values would be upheld if the defense were
recognized-individualized justice and cultural pluralism.23
Furthermore, these clashes of cultures may create seemingly unfair,
harsh consequences for the alien offender.' The proponents of the
cultural defense compare the cultural defense to other state of mind
defenses, such as the battered woman defense, the Vietnam veteran
defense, and post-traumatic stress disorder defenses.'
themselves against police officers if the police officers use unreasonable force or excessive force."
Talbot, supra note 17, at 16.
19. To establish criminal liability, the state must prove the joint union of act and intent; the
mens tea and actus rea must both be present in order to incur criminal responsibility. The operation
of a cultural defense must negate a showing of intent at the time of the occurrence of the act
charged. See Lyman, supra note 1, at 98.
20. See, e.g., Michael D. Harris, Cours Ambivalent to 'CulturalDefense', U.P.I., December
13, 1987, available in LEXIS, News Library, UPI File; see also Don J. DeBenedictis, Judges
Debate Cultural Defense: Should Crimes Acceptable in an Immigrant's Homeland Be Punished?,
A.B.A. J., Dec. 1992, at 28. The cultural excuse is not recognized because it would violate the
maxim, "ignorance of the law is no excuse." See Julia P. Sams, The Availability of a "Cultural
Defense" as an Excuse for Criminal Behavior, 16 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 335, 335-45 (1986).
21. Lyman, supra note 1, at 88.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 144-63.
23. Note, The Cultural Defense in Criminal Law, 99 HARv. L. REv. 1293, 1298-1307(1986)
[hereinafter Cultural Defense] (arguing for a recognition of a formalized cultural defense in order
to further the dual goals of individualized justice and cultural pluralism).
24. Alison Dundes Rentelen, a lawyer and political science professor at the University of
Southern California, has argued that the defense is "necessary and important" and should be
formally recognized. DeBenedictis, supra note 20, at 28. A pluralistic society like the United States
is "only pretending to accept cultural diversity if it rejects it when it really matters." Id.
25. Cultural Defense, supra note 23, at 1299 (stating that the battered spouse defense was
created in response to situations where convicting the defendant would be unfair, but traditional
defenses of self-defense and insanity would not be entirely appropriate). See infra text
accompanying notes 205-23.
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Opponents of a formalized cultural defense' support the
established criminal law maxim that "ignorance of the law is no
excuse."' They contend that traditional criminal law defenses are still
available to those immigrant defendants. ' There are potential harmful
repercussions to the American legal system. 2 Permitting the defense
promotes an unfair policy towards the majority to whom the defense is
unavailable,30 and the defense violates principals of legality.3' There
are further problems in delineating the scope of the cultural defense.3"
Additionally, the opponents assert that a recognition of the cultural
defense would, in essence, condone and even encourage, the violence
toward women33 that is practiced throughout the world.3'
The first section of this Comment will explore the cultural and
historical basis from which the cultural defense has arisen. Next, the
second section will analyze the major cases in the context of a state of
mind defense. The third section will address the viability of recognizing
a formalized cultural defense by evaluating whether the defense would
fulfill the goals of the criminal justice system. Determining that it would
not, the last section will compare the cultural defense to other state of
mind defenses, and will finally conclude that the cultural defense is
impractical and inherently unfair to the very groups it purports to
protect.
II. Historical Background
Although the recognition of a formal cultural defense is new, the
idea of this defense has been briefly encountered in past cases. For
example, in 1836, the English case of Rex v. Esop35 dealt with a native
26. See infra text and accompanying notes 164-90.
27. Sams, supra note 20, at 335; see, e.g., Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U.S.
56, 85-6 (1908).
28. Sams, supra note 20, at 339-40.
29. Id. at 245.
30. Id. at 350.
31. Id. at 351.
32. See Lyman, supra note 1, at 109 (contending that "[tihe use of the defense could arguably
extend beyond actions motivated by cultural traditions. It could ostensibly grow to incorporate
actions performed for religious or political reasons as well.").
33. See infra text and accompanying notes 191-204.
34. See, e.g., Cathy Young, Equal Cultures-or Equality?; There's a Choice to Make Between
Feminism and Multiculturalism, WASH. POST, March 29, 1992, at C5 (arguing against the cultural
defense: "Shall we condone the slaying of unfaithful wives by husbands avenging their honor if that
was the custom in their native countries?"). See also Melissa Spatz, A "Lesser" Crime: A
Comparative Study of Legal Defenses for Men Who Kill their Wives, 24 COLUMB. J. L. & Soc.
PROBS. 597 (1991) (contending that male violence toward women is a worldwide phenomenon).
35. 175 Eng. Rep. 203 (Cent. Crim. Ct. 1836) (cited in Lyman, supra note 1, at 89).
CULTURAL DEFENSE
of Baghdad who was convicted for committing an "unnatural offense"
which he claimed was not a criminal act in his native land.36
Nevertheless, even after being presented with information about the
defendant's culture, the court did not reduce his criminal responsibility.
The United States also decided not to consider evidence of culture
in determining why an immigrant would choose not to obey the laws of
this country. In 1851, Secretary of State Daniel Webster said
Every foreigner born residing in a country owes to that country
allegiance and obedience so long as he remains in it, as a duty upon
him by the mere fact of his residence, and that temporary protection
which he enjoys, and is as much bound to obey its laws as native
subjects or citizens."
Later, courts in the United States began to change their views. A
1923 study called The Immigrant's Day in Court" cited a number of
cases in which judges accepted a defense based on cultural
differences.39 For instance, in New York, an immigrant charged with
entering a house and intending to steal argued that he could not read the
house address and had become confused.' The magistrate, displaying
"an appreciation of the difficulties of the foreign-born," accepted the
defendant's argument and released the man.41  In other cases,
differences in traditions also have been invoked to rebut charges of
statutory rape or child molestation of children who are the appropriate
marrying age in the defendants' cultures.42
Today, however, due to their large numbers and diverse cultural
traditions, Asians are the group to whom the cultural defense seems most
often to pertain.' Asians represent the largest group of legal
immigrants and refugees to arrive in the United States in the last twenty
years." The 4.1 million Asians in the United States now represent 1.8
percent of the population.' However, their Far Eastern culture is
drastically dissimilar than Western cultural and legal assumptions.' In
36. Lyman, supra note 1, at 89.
37. Carlisle v. United States, 83 U.S. 147, 155 (1873). See Lyman, supra note 1, at 89.





43. Spencer Sherman, When Cultures Collide, CAL. LAW.. January 1986, at 33, 36.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See Lyman, supra note 1, at 91; see also Asian Culture Tough on U.S. Judicial System,
U.P.I, August 10, 1985, available in LEXIS, News Library, UPI File.
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addition, these immigrants are not a coherent group. They come from
many different countries, bringing many different traditions and
cultures.' Moreover, Asian immigrants have immigrated in large
numbers for many years and have now assimilated into the American
culture.' On the other hand, European immigrants might not need a
cultural defense because the laws of their homelands generally originate
from the same roots as the law of the United States. 9
While the defense is most often used by immigrants, Native
American defendants have also argued a cultural defense to excuse their
crimes." Additionally, an individual's socio-economic culture has been
cited as increasingly popular evidence in criminal defense.5 It is
inevitable that "more and more cases will arise where the issues of
ethnicity are going to reach court because people are clinging far harder
to traditions than they used to."52 Several seminal cases clearly
articulate the present dilemma of the courts in addressing and disposing
of the proposed cultural defense. Due to the rapidly growing rate of
immigrants, the courts will soon be forced to directly confront the issues
of culture and set determinative precedent. The next section sets forth
the recent cases in which a defendant has attempted to utilize a cultural
defense.
III. Recent Cases Using the Cultural Defense
Recently, defense attorneys have attempted to present cultural
factors as evidence of a diminished state of mind where their clients'
47. Asian immigrants to the United States consist, among others, of Filipino, Chinese, Korean,
Indian, Thai, Laotian, Japanese, and Cambodian backgrounds. Sherman, supra note 43, at 36.
48. Oliver, supra note 9, at 1.
49. Id.
50. The case of State v. Butler involved Native-American defendants who had killed a man who
had desecrated an ancient Indian burial ground. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. In the
case of People v. Croy, the defense presented evidence on the "Native American experience" to
explain the defendant's state of mind when he committed the crime. See supra note 17 and
accompanying text; see infra text and accompanying notes 122-38.
51. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 938 F.2d 1293 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (socio-economic
background relevant to sentencing); see also United States v. Valdez-Gonzalez, 957 F.2d 643 (9th
Cir. 1992).
Evidence has also been presented describing the African-American experience. For example,
in United States v. Banks, No. 71-64SAW (N.D. Cal. 1971), the defendant, in his defense against
charges of bank robbery, was allowed to introduce evidence of general psychological principals,
including the defendant's upbringing, problems and strengths, and the historical-sociological
experience of a Black person in America.
52. Oliver, supra note 9, at 1 (quoting Deirdre Evans Pritchard, a British-born University of
Southern California instructor with degrees in anthropology and folklore).
CULTURAL DEFENSE
cultural background is relevant.53  Four such cases provide the
foundation for precedent and display the courts' ambivalence in disposing
of these issues. While none of these cases present a cultural defense per
se, each addresses cultural factors in assessing the defendant's state of
mind.
A. People v. Kimura4
On January 29, 1985, Fumiko Kimura, a 32-year-old Japanese
woman, left her home and took her children on a long bus ride.55 She
abandoned her baby stroller at the bus stop and then walked into the
Santa Monica bay, carrying her two young children to their deaths.56
Mrs. Kimura had become despondent after she had learned of her
husband's three year affair.' She wanted a means to rid herself of the
shame and humiliation of her husband's acts.58
The Japanese call it oyako-shinju-parent-child suicide-a tragic
practice that is all too common. 9 Although oyako-shinju is illegal in
Japan, survivors are rarely punished due to traditional beliefs about the
honor of suicide and the closeness of the parent-child bond.' A mother
who commits suicide without her children is seen as dooming them to the
disgrace of living in an orphanage or with a single parent.6' She is
scorned as oni no you no hito, a demon-like person.62 A woman in
Mrs. Kimura's position might be pitied in Japan; the shame of having
failed at her own suicide would be regarded as punishment enough.63
53. See discussion infra parts III A-D.
54. No. A-091133 (Santa Monica Super. Ct. Nov. 21, 1985).
55. Pound, supra note 5, at 1.
56. Michael Reese, A Tragedy in Santa Monica, NEWSWEEK, May 6, 1985, at 10. Mrs.
Kimura survived, consumed with anguish and resentment at herself and those who saved her. "They
must have been Caucasians," she thought. "Otherwise, they would have let me die." Id.
57. Id.
58. Sherman, supra note 3, at 26.
59. Reese, supra note 54, at 11.
60. According to Yoshiko Yamaguchi, a consultant to San Fernando Valley Japanese
Community Center, oyako-shinju occurs in Japan because people feel they are in a situation of losing
face or that they are a burden to society. Pound, supra note 5, at 1. Kimura, believing herself to
be a failure as a mother, a wife, and a person, probably considered oyako-shinju to be the only
honorable course to take. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. In fact, when police filed charges against her, Mrs. Kimura did not even realize that
she was accused of murder. She told her attorney that she thought her crime was failed suicide.
Id.
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In this case, the Japanese community rushed to Mrs. Kimura's
defense.' Four thousand members of the Japanese community signed
a petition and sent it to the Los Angeles County district attorney, asking
the prosecutor to apply "modern Japanese law" to the case.6
However, the prosecutor, defense attorney, and presiding judge
declined.' Mrs. Kimura pleaded not guilty to first degree murder.67
After entering into a plea bargain, Mrs. Kimura was allowed to plead no
contest" to lesser voluntary manslaughter charges.69 The court then
sentenced her to one year in prison and five years probation.70
Instead of using a formalized cultural defense, Mrs. Kimura's
attorney7' argued an insanity defense.' He contended that she was not
a rational person at the time of her guilty act and that she was "mentally
deranged at the time-with a Japanese flavor, a Japanese fashion."
73
Psychiatrists testified that Mrs. Kimura was suffering from psychotic
depression and delusions when she attempted to commit parent-child
suicide.74 Moreover, psychiatric reports indicated that Mrs. Kimura
failed to have the requisite malice aforethought at the time of the
crime.75 It is evident that in Mrs. Kimura's case, the state of mind
defense such as insanity was closely aligned to that of culture. Although
the defense attorney did not argue a formal cultural defense, cultural
64. Id.
65. Sherman, supra note 3, at 26. The petition asserted that "the roots of her Japanese
culture" directed Mrs. Kimura's acts. Id. In her native land, she would be charged at most with
involuntary manslaughter "resulting in a light, suspended sentence, probation and supervised
rehabilitation." Id.
66. For a detailed analysis on how current Japanese law would have treated Mrs. Kimura, see
Bryant, supra note 7, at 10-31.
67. Pound, supra note 5, at 1.
68. This plea has been defined as a formal declaration by the accused that he will not contend
with the prosecuting authority under the charge. 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 492 (1981). It
is not a plea in the strict sense of that term in criminal law, but rather an unwillingness to plead and
present a defense. Id.
69. Michael Harris, supra note 20, at 6.
70. Oliver, supra note 9, at 1. Mrs. Kimura had already served her jail sentence at the time
of sentencing. She was also ordered to undergo mandatory psychiatric counseling. Id.
71. Gerald K. Klausner of Marina Del Ray, California, was Mrs. Kimura's defense attorney.
Sherman, supra note 3, at 26.
72. The insanity defense supposes that people who are insane are not blameworthy, because
their different mental processes prevent them from recognizing the wrongness of certain actions, or
leave them no real opportunity to control their actions. Susan N. Herman, About Crime: Should
Culture be a Defense?, NEWSDAY, April 20, 1989, at 80.
73. Pound, supra note 5, at 1.
74. Harris, supra note 20, at 6.
75. See generally Malek-Mithra Sheybani, Cultural Defense: One Person's Culture is
Another's Crime, 9 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 751 (1987) (discussing the legal ramifications
of Mrs. Kimura's act in comparison to the California Penal Code and Model Penal Code).
CULTURAL DEFENSE
factors still contributed to the reduced charge and sentence. The
following case also illustrates that cultural background may be relevant
to criminal responsibility.
B. People v. Moua 6
On April 25, 1985, a Laotian refugee named Kong Moua drove to
the campus of Fresno City College searching for his fiance, Xeng
Xiong." After locating her in the college finance office, he then drove
her to his cousin's house78 and had sexual relations with her that
night.7 However, his intended bride called the act rape.10
Moua is an immigrant and a member of the Hmong tribe."'
Hmong tribesmen from the mountains of Laos practice a form of
marriage called zijpoj niam, or marriage-by-capture. Zij poj niam is
similar to elopement, and this form of marriage is an accepted ritual in
their culture.' In following the custom," a man abducts the bride of
his choice, although he must first inform her parentsY Prior to the
marriage, a courtship flourishes, consisting of love letters, flirting, an
exchange of gifts, and even chaperoned dates.' Finally, on the date of
marriage, the man takes the woman to his family's home where the
union is consummated. According to Hmong tradition the woman
must protest and say, "I am not ready."' She would not otherwise be
considered virtuous and chaste." The man must persist in
consummating the union, despite her protests, in order to appear strong
76. No. 315972-0 (Fresno County Super. Ct. Feb. 7, 1985).
77. Sherman, supra note 43, at 33.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Thompson, supra note 2, at 27. At least two cases of this type have found their way into
the courts of Fresno, California.
81. Oliver, supra note 9, at 1.
82. Sherman, supra note 43, at 36.
83. Oliver, supra note 9, at 1.
84. Kong Moua practiced the custom according to tradition, and he claimed that he performed
all the required acts. See Sherman, supra note 3, at 27.
85. Oliver, supra note 9, at 1.
86. Thompson, supra note 2, at 27.
87. Id.
88. Thompson, supra note 2, at 25. Deputy Public Defender Kenneth Carrington stated, "The
culture requires her to weep and moan and groan." Id.
89. Id.
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and masculine.' Once the union is consummated, the woman cannot
marry any other Hmong man. 91
Since 1980, an estimated 30,000 Hmongs have migrated to the San
Joaquin Valley near Fresno, California.' The marriage practice of zij
poj niam has resulted in several kidnapping and rape charges against
several immigrant Hmong men.'o In this case, Moua pled guilty to a
misdemeanor of false imprisonment." 4 After hearing the testimony of
the parties and witnesses and reviewing a doctoral dissertation on Hmong
marriage rituals, the judge sentenced the defendant to ninety days in the
county jail. 9' The defendant was also fined $1,000.00, with $900.00
presented to the woman as reparation. %
Again, a formalized representation of a cultural defense was not
argued. While the defense attorney could have utilized a mistake of fact
defense,' the charge was instead mitigated using cultural factors.9"
The defendant was reported to be enormously surprised when the charges
were filed against him.99 He believed that he had received the proper
cultural signals from the victim, and thus had obtained her agreement to
90. Id. at 27. If a woman continues to resist the union, however, and officials are called in,
police and judges must decide whether she was merely fabricating the ritual declarations required
by her tradition, or was, in fact, resisting. With that distinction in mind, the question turns on
whether her abductor is guilty of rape. Sherman, supra note 3, at 27.





95. Thompson, supra note 2, at 28.
96. Oliver, supra note 9, at 1.
97. Under this defense, a standard for measuring the actor's subjective state of mind determines
whether or not he is held responsible for committing the crime. Sams, supra note 20, at 343-45.
A mistake of fact will be a defense if it negates the state of mind when the defendant's act would
have been lawful if the facts were as he supposed them to be. The defendant must show that his
mistake was an honest one and that his behavior was prompted by this mistake. Id.
In the Moua case, the tribesman could have made an honest mistake concerning the woman's
consent, and it would have been reasonable for him to believe that her resistance was a mere
pretense.
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962), which provides that:
Ignorance or mistake as to the matter of fact or law is a defense if: (a) the ignorance or
mistake negatives the purpose, knowledge, belief, recklessness or negligence required to
establish a material element of the offense.
98. The judge in the case reported that a plea bargain that reduced the charges to misdemeanor
false imprisonment gave him "leeway to get into all these cultural issues and to try to tailor a
sentence that would fulfill both [his] needs and the Hmong needs." Sherman, supra note 43, at 36,
60. He further stated: "We can handle all these cases at the time of. sentencing by attempting to
show mitigation, rather than [using the cultural defense] as a pure defense." Id. at 60.
99. Sherman, supra note 10, at 28.
CULTURAL DEFENSE
the traditional marriage ritual.t The prosecutor and the judge
believed both the defendant, who genuinely thought the woman wanted
to participate in the marriage ritual, and the woman, who genuinely did
not consent.' 0' The prosecutor conceded, after the judge's ruling, that
cultural factors were considered to a certain extent. 101 The judge even
asserted that "[i]ntent gets muddled when you've got a cultural thing that
prevents [criminal] intent from being formed." 103
Similar to Kimura,"°4 a cultural defense was not presented in this
case. However, cultural factors led to a plea bargain and a reduced
sentence for the Hmong immigrant. The next case further illustrates the
persuasiveness of cultural testimony.
C. People v. Chen'05
On September 7, 1987, Dong Lu Chen, who had immigrated from
China one year earlier,"° decided to speak to his wife, Jian Wan Chen,
about their sexual relationship.' When she admitted to having an
affair, he left the room, returned with a claw hammer, knocked her onto
the bed, and hit her on the head eight times until she was dead."o
Burton Pasternak, a professor of anthropology at Hunter College,
testified on Chen's behalf."°9  Dr. Pasternak explained that in the
Chinese culture, a woman's adultery is proof of her husband's weak
character and a source of great shame upon his ancestors." 0  A
husband often becomes enraged upon learning of his wife's infidelity and
threatens to kill her."' However, the close-knit Chinese community
usually intervenes and offers help to the family before the husband can
carry out his threat." 2 Chen's defense was based on the premise that
there was no community to protect Jian Wan Chen.' " The court found
Chen guilty of the lesser crime of second degree manslaughter and
100. Sherman, supra note 3, at 27.
101. Sheybani, supra note 75, at 774.
102. The prosecutor stated, "Judging from the sentence, the court bought [the cultural defense]
to a certain extent." Thompson, supra note 2, at 28.
103. Sherman, supra note 3, at 34.
104. People v. Kimura, No. A-091133 (Santa Monica Super. Ct. Nov. 21, 1985).
105. People v. Chen, No. 87-7774 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 21, 1989).
106. Sherman, supra note 10, at 3.
107. Id.; see also Hurtado, supra note 14, at 25.
108. Spatz, supra note 34, at 622; see also Sherman, supra note 10, at 28.
109. Sherman, supra note 10, at 28.
110. Id.
111. Hurtado, supra note 14, at 25.
112. Sherman, supra note 10, at 28.
113. Id.; see also Spatz, supra note 34, at 622.
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sentenced him to five years probation, the lightest possible sentence for
the charge. 114
Chen's defense attorney argued a modified version of a cultural
defense. He contended that cultural pressures had resulted in Chen's
"diminished capacity," rendering Chen unable to form the necessary
intent for premeditated murder." 5  The presiding judge found that
Chen "was driven to violence by traditional Chinese values about
adultery and loss of manhood." ' 6 The judge concluded that Chen's
heritage made him more "susceptible to cracking under the
circumstances, "1 7 resulting in a diminished capacity to form criminal
intent." 8 Nevertheless, the judge also found that "[i]f a judge made
a ruling on a cultural background, it would be wrong. It wasn't that it
was a defense, but it totally affected this man. He's not a loose cannon.
That's the point. He never displayed any psychopathic tendencies. " '
As the defense argued, Chen could not form the requisite intent because
he was "off the edge of the earth as he knew it."" 2
In the Chen case, the cultural defense again emerged in another
form pertaining to state of mind. This time, a diminished capacity
defense operated to encompass the cultural defense in its penumbra. 2'
114. The charge was reduced from second degree murder. See Hurtado, supra note 14, at 25.
The judge also considered other factors in giving Chen the lightest sentence, such as his lack of
record, his remorse, his meek behavior during the year and a half he spent in jail awaiting trial, and
the unlikelihood that he would commit another crime. See Celestine Bohlen, Holtzman May Appeal
Probation For Immigrant in Wife's Slaying, N.Y. TIMEs, April 5, 1989, at 3.
115. Defense lawyers argued that cultural pressures had provoked Chen into an extreme mental
state of "diminished capacity," leaving him without the ability to form the intent necessary for more
serious charges of premeditated murder. Hurtado, supra note 14, at 25.
116. Jetter, supra note 15, at 4.
117. Hurtado, supra note 14, at 25 (quoting Judge Edward Pincus, the presiding judge, who
stated: "I don't think this man would have killed her under any other circumstances.").
118. Courts that recognize a diminished capacity defense describe it as
an abnormal mental condition tending to prove either that the accused could not or did
not entertain the state of mind essential to that offense. Such evidence, though not
sufficient in itself to establish legal insanity, should be considered for the purpose of
determining whether the crime charged, or a lesser offense thereof, was in fact
committed.
21 AM. JUR. 2D CriminalLaw § 41 (1981); see People v. Ford, 416 P.2d 132 (Cal. 1966); see also
State v. Vigliano, 202 A.2d 652 (N.J. 1964).
119. Hurtado, supra note 14, at 25. The judge further asserted that he "was convinced that
what happened at that time was because he had become temporarily, totally deranged." Id.
120. Sherman, supra note 10, at 28.
121. In his oral opinion on his ruling, the trial judge explained:
Were this crime committed by the defendant as someone who was born and raised
in America, even in the Chinese American Community, the Court would have been
constrained to find the defendant guilty of manslaughter in the first degree.
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Again, cultural factors reduced criminal responsibility. The defense,
however, is not limited to immigrants. While the previous cases have all
concerned immigrants of Asian background, the following case presents
the cultural defense as argued by a Native American.
D. People v. Croy22
On July 16, 1978, a band of young Native Americans, after
allegedly robbing a liquor store, led the police on a high-speed chase
near the Oregon border."z Patrick "Hooty" Croy drove the getaway
car to his grandmother's house." Once there, he stripped off his shirt
and shoes like an Indian warrior, found some ammunition in the house,
and fatally shot a Caucasian police officer."z  Hooty Croy was
convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death."~
On appeal, Croy's defense attorney utilized a different form of the
cultural defense from that of the previous cases. The defense argued
culture in the context of the Native American experience in the United
States and in the paradigm of tradition."V Croy's defense attorney, J.
Tony Serra, beguiled the jury with stories of the killing and enslaving of
Indians who stood in the way of the claims in the Gold Rush, of local
governments paying fifty cent bounties for Indian scalps and heads, and
of Indian children being kidnapped and sold to the miners as sexual
slaves. 21 In his motion to the court, Serra stated:
But, this Court cannot ignore the testimony, the very cogent forceful testimony of
Doctor Pasternak, who is, perhaps, the greatest expert in America on China and
interfamilial relationships.
The one thing that he did very forcefully state, the one big difference with a
Chinese person in China is someone like the defendant who does not live within a
Chinese community, such as he did in China, where the whole community interacts as
a safety valve to prevent excess in physical response to all sorts of factors.
Record at 301-02, People v. Chen, No. 87-7774 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 21, 1989).
122. People v. Croy, No. 52587 (Placer County Super. Ct. Apr. 1990).
123. David Talbot, supra note 17, at 16; see also Katherine Bishop, One Indian's Revolving
Path to Prison, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1991, at 24.
124. Talbot, supra note 17, at 16.
125. Jesse Joe "Bo" Hittson of Yreka, California was the police officer. Id.
126. Id. at 17; see also Pamela A. MacLean, U.P.I., June 1, 1990, available in LEXIS, News
Library, UPI File (describing how Croy is the second man freed from prison since 1977 after
serving on California's death row).
127. This was the first time a cultural defense based on anti-Indian sentiment had ever been
allowed. See Maclean, supra note 127.
128. Talbot, supra note 17, at 16. Serra told the jury: "The Indian was an impediment to the
white man's Manifest Destiny. Get rid of him, like the coyote." Id. He continued with his
defense, stating that "[t]he bad blood still flows between whites and Indians in Yreka." Id.
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The jury must be apprised of the difference and complexities of the
Indian experience-for this defendant's individual perspective has
been shaped by his experience as an Indian within the collective and
historical experiences of genocide, enslavement, disenfranchisement,
and dispossession of civil, property, and religious rights at the hands
of an invading white culture."2
Additionally, Serra articulated that "every Indian is aware that at any
time, the lurking, historical pattern of genocidal racism against Indian
people can surface, whether in the form of white citizen violence or
police aggression."1' °
Once again, the defense strategy did not use a formalized argument
of the cultural defense. Instead, the defense claimed that Croy acted in
self-defense, that he genuinely feared imminent harm, and that this belief
was objectively reasonable under the circumstances. 3' In this vein,
Croy argued that he believed that the police in the world in which he
lived exterminated Indians." The judge allowed this testimony of
cultural experience, deciding it was relevant if it had "seeped into the
consciousness" of the defendant and affected his state of mind during the
guilty act.'33 Finally, after five months of testimony, the jury returned
a verdict of not guilty on all counts.34
Although People v. Croy 3s presents a different scenario from the
previous cases-one in which an American citizen presented cultural
129. Defendant's Notice of Motion and Motion Regarding Admissibility of Evidence in Support
of Defendant's Claim of Self-Defense at 10, People v. Croy, No. 52587 (Placer County Super Ct.
Apr. 1990).
130. Id. Serra further argues:
Under such circumstances, societal ignorance and misperceptions concerning Indians
[illustrates] whether the jury can fairly consider defendant's claim of self-defense.
Without testimony regarding the history [sic], psychological, and cultural ramifications
of the treatment of the Indian people by the white settlers, as well as testimony regarding
the current treatment of and attitudes towards Indians, the jury will have no basis to
overcome dangerous stereotypes and no context within which to consider the
reasonableness of defendant's beliefs and conduct.
Id. at 11.
131. Id. In his motion to the court, attorney Serra successfully admitted into evidence expert
and lay testimony pertaining to the "social, historical, cultural and psychological elements which
operated on the defendant in this case." Id. This, he argued, would help to explain why Croy's
belief of imminent harm was reasonable. Id. at 16.
132. Id. at 17 (Croy submitted that he shot Officer Hittson in self-defense, believing that he was
about to be killed). See also Bishop, supra note 118, at 24.
133. Talbot, supra note 17, at 16.
134. Id.; see also Bishop, supra note 123, at 24. However, since Croy was still under a life
sentence for conspiracy and assault convictions, he was released on ten years probation on the
condition that he abstain from alcohol and marijuana. Id.
135. People v. Croy, No. 52587 (Placer County Super. Ct. Apr. 1990).
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considerations at trial' 6l-a transformed usage of the cultural defense
again operated to negate the state of mind required for performing the
crime. In the Croy case, the cultural defense assumed the role of self-
defense. However, even the defense attorney declared that the
cornerstone of Croy's defense was a "cultural defense. "'s7
Each of these preceding cases illustrates the dilemmas that the courts
face in confronting cultural factors as probative evidence to evaluate state
of mind. The courts seem ambivalent in addressing culture as a defense,
and different courts have carved out their own separate and independent
theories of application. Because there is no prescribed standard for
adjudicating culture, courts are uncertain as to how to proceed. It is thus
necessary to consider if a formalized, standardized cultural defense
would be viable and beneficial in the criminal justice system. The
following section addresses this controversial issue.
IV. The Viability of the Cultural Defense
The cultural defense, if formally adopted, would operate as an
excuse for an otherwise criminal act. 3 Under the present justice
system, the act would be considered wrongful; however, the actor would
be excused because he lacked the requisite mental culpability.3 9 For
instance, in the case of State v. Butler,"4 four Native American youths
were tried for killing a man whom they believed to have been desecrating
their sacred Indian burial ground.' 4' If a cultural defense had been
applied in this case, they would have been excused from moral
blame. 42  While there are meritorious ideological arguments both
supporting and contesting the recognition of a formal cultural defense,
adoption ultimately turns on the viability and consequences of the
defense.
136. This is contrasted with a situation in which an immigrant from another country who uses
a cultural defense to show a common tradition or accepted practice in his home culture.
137. Bishop, supra note 123, at 24.
138. See Cultural Defense, supra note 23, at 1296 (explaining that the note argues for an excuse
rather than a justification to the crime).
139. Id.
140. State v. Butler, No. 44496 (Lincoln County Cir. Ct. filed-Mar. 11, 1981).
141. Sherman, supra note 3, at 27.
142. Id. However, the cultural defense was not presented in this case. Rather, the defense
decided that "the idea would not get anywhere." Id. In any event, some Native Americans residing
in the area felt that the acts could possibly be regarded as self-defense. Id.
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A. Beneficial Consequences of a Recognition of the Cultural Defense
The American justice system focuses on the mens rea, guilty mind,
and the actus rea, guilty act, of a defendant in order to determine an
appropriate punishment for a crime.143 The system strives to ask two
questions. First, do we want to hold this person guilty of a crime?
Second, do we find this person morally blameworthy? The proponents
of a cultural defense contend that the defendants in these cases are not
morally culpable and that they did not establish the necessary mens rea
for committing the act.'" Arguably, the defendants were merely
following the dictates of their own culture. 45 For example, in People
v. Chen,'" the judge opined that the defendant's culpability was
weakened due to his Chinese culture. 47 In his ruling, the judge
concluded that "the defendant had a frustrated mental aberration.""
He further explained that
[it does not rise to the level of legal insanity, but, based on cultural
aspects, the effect of the wife's behavior on someone who is
essentially born in China, raised in China, and took all his Chinese
culture with him to the United States except the community which
would moderate his behavior .... For those reasons, the Court has
found him not guilty of manslaughter in the first degree."'"
While it was not a complete excuse, the defense of culture operated to
lessen culpability and mitigate the defendant's sentence."' Thus, the
defendant was found not to be as morally blameworthy as someone with
heightened intent.
143. Sheybani, supra note 75, at 752.
144. Lyman, supra note 1, at 98 (stating that "[tihe operation of a cultural defense, if any, must
of necessity negate a showing of the presence of the requisite mens rea at the time of the occurrence
of the act charged.").
145. See, e.g., Mull v. United States, 402 F.2d 571 (9th Cir. 1968) (characterizing as
"intriguing" the suggestion that a Native American lacked criminal intent when he assaulted a person
whom he believed was exercising witchcraft over his mind, but rejecting the argument because the
defendant had not testified to such a belief at trial); see also People v. Gebreamlak, No. 80276
(Alameda County Super. Ct. 1985) (allowing a psychiatrist to testify at trial that an Ethiopian man
who murdered a woman who he thought was exercising witchcraft over his mind held beliefs
consistent with other Ethiopians).
146. People v. Chen, No. 87-7774 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 21, 1989).
147. See supra text accompanying notes 100-16.
148. Record at 302, People v. Chen, No. 52587 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 21, 1989).
149. Id. at 303.
150. Cultural factors have further influenced the discretionary sentencing decisions of judges.
See, e.g., State v. Etchison, 195 N.W.2d 498, 501 (Neb. 1972) (noting that the defendant's cultural
background is relevant to sentencing); see also State v. Curbello-Rodriguez, 351 N.W.2d 758, 770
(Wis. 1984) (Bablitch, J., concurring) (arguing that the sexual mores of the defendant's Cuban
culture were relevant factors in sentencing for a rape conviction).
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Proponents of the cultural defense further argue that the American
legal system is committed to individualized justice and legal
pluralism.' They contend that because of mitigating circumstances,
it may be unfair to punish a particular defendant to the outer limits of the
law.5 2  Consequently, "treating persons raised in a foreign culture
differently should be viewed as a vindication of the principles of fairness
and equality that underlie an individualized system of justice."
5 3
Immigrants from another culture may feel morally obligated to follow the
norms of their former community.'1 Accordingly, the goal of moral
blameworthiness in the American legal system would be recognized in
conjunction with the cultural defense.
The benefit of cultural pluralism would also be sustained if a
cultural defense was recognized. Cultural pluralism is an example of
American philosophy to protect the preservation of the cultures of
immigrant groups within the context of citizenship and integration into
society.' Cultural pluralism maintains a diversity of cultural identities
by preserving ethnic values. 156  The doctrine enhances respect,
understanding, and tolerance of the many different cultures and
backgrounds that contribute to the American culture. '5 Proponents
argue that "it is hard to imagine a system more likely to convince a
person that the majority regards his culture as inferior than one that
punishes him for conforming to his own culture."' However, while
cultural pluralism is a valuable ideal, a recognition of a cultural defense
must also forward the goals of the criminal justice system in order to be
embraced into a legal doctrine.
Two goals of the American legal system are indeed moral
blameworthiness and individualized justice. A recognition of a formal
151. See Cultural Defense, supra note 23, at 1298-1307.
152. Id. at 1299 (explaining that "[tihis notion of justice may be phrased in terms of the formal
principle of equality, which requires that equals be treated equally and unequals unequally").
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1300.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1301 (arguing that equality among different ethnic groups ultimately requires that
each group respect other groups' rights to be different).
157. The prosecutor in the Chen case argued that there should be "one standard of justice, not
one that depends on the cultural background of the defendant." Herman, supra note 72, at 80. But
see Cultural Defense, supra note 23, at 1293. Proponents contend that one standard ofjustice is too
rigid to accommodate the experiences of people who grew up with a different morality from our
own, and that one monolithic standard of justice is simply inappropriate in a pluralistic society.
Herman, supra, at 80.
158. Cultural Defense, supra note 23, at 1302 (contending that there is a possibility that
repudiation of the cultural defense will send out the message that ethnic groups must trade in their
cultural values for those of the majority).
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cultural defense may further these goals by taking into account factors
inherent to an individual. However, individualized justice without a
coherent framework is anarchy.' 59 It is important to question how far
society is willing to extend individualized justice."6 Everyone in the
United States'6' comes from an original culture other than "American."
How practical, then, is this defense if it can theoretically be applied to
everyone? 62 In reality, the defense is not only impractical, but many
other goals of the criminal justice system would be thwarted if the
defense was accepted. There are detriments to the cultural defense that
cannot be overcome by the proponents' suppositions.
B. Detrimental Consequences of a Recognition of the Cultural
Defense
Opponents of recognizing a formalized cultural defense point to the
maxim of law, "ignorance of the law is no excuse." 63 They contend
that an immigrant to this country has a duty to understand and adhere to
the laws of the United States. " This is most often understood as the
"when in Rome" philosophy.'6
Perhaps the most severe detriment toward a recognition of a cultural
defense is that the defense has a threatening "slippery slope" that may
inhibit its viability as a formalized defense."'6 It is evident that cultural
159. Sherman, supra note 3, at 1 (quoting the prosecutor in Kimura, who remarked that
allowing a cultural defense might lead society to anarchy).
160. See Herman, supra note 72, at 80 (arguing that the problem with recognizing a cultural
defense as an excuse is that the slope of determinism is a slippery one).
161. All Americans can trace their ancestry to a foreign culture, with the exception of Native
Americans who, ironically, have attempted the cultural defense. See People v. Croy, No. 52587
(Placer County Super. Ct. Apr. 1990).
162. Herman, supra note 72, at 80 (contending that "to understand all is to forgive all. But,
if we forgive all, we have no criminal law left .... The line dividing those we excuse and those
we condemn is a lot more arbitrary than we would like to think. The issue of the cultural defense
is unsettling because it shows our line is really a fault line.").
163. See, e.g., Sams, supra note 25, at 335. See also Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S.
226, 258 (1945); Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U.S. 56, 85-86 (1908). The notion has
been justified because ignorance of the law would interfere with law enforcement, and "the claim
would be easy to assert and hard to disprove." United States v. Barker, 546 F.2d 940, 964-65
(D.C. Cir. 1976) (Leventhal, J., dissenting).
164. According to Vilay Chaleunrath, director of the Indochinese Community Center in
Washington D.C., immigrants must abide by the laws of the United States once they immigrate to
this country. "If the law is that you must not fish during off-season, you must abide by this."
Telephone Interview with Vilay Chaleunrath (October 10, 1993).
165. See, e.g., Michael Harris, Courts Ambivalent to 'Cultural Defense,' UPI, Dec. 13, 1987,
available in LEXIS, News Library, UPI File.
166. See Lyman, supra note 1, at 109 (arguing that a "Pandora's Box" would be opened for the
doctrines of criminal responsibility because the doctrine could possibly extend beyond actions
motivated by cultural traditions).
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arguments are sometimes considered when foreigners who have no
comprehension of American law enter the courtroom. 67 However,
People v. Croy" illustrates that it is also possible to use the defense
to describe the state of mind of people indigenous to the United
States. 69 In Croy, the cultural defense was employed in explaining the
"Native American experience" and how that experience affected the
mindset of the defendant. The defense attorney argued the history of a
people, the generations of racism, and the psychological effects of both
on his client.' °  He asserted that the jury had the enormous
responsibility to right a great wrong and finally bestow justice on those
downtrodden people that his client represented.' 7'
If it is possible to present evidence of the Native American
experience as a cultural defense, it is also likely that defenses will be
attempted by any minority who has suffered an inhibiting "experience"
in America.' 2 For example, defendants may present evidence on the
"African American experience," or the "Japanese American experience,"
or the "Hispanic experience" in America.' " While any of these
167. There are several other documented, recent incidents in which immigrants attempted to
present cultural evidence as a defense. For example, a Nigerian insurance salesman in Houston,
accused of child abuse for hitting his misbehaving nephew and then putting pepper in the boy's
abrasions, argued that the practice was acceptable discipline in his native Nigeria. He received a
probationary sentence. Oliver, supra note 9, at 1.
In Los Angeles, a Vietnamese family avoided child abuse charges after a friend explained that
a boy's wounds were the result of cao gio, or "coining.* a folk remedy to cure headaches by
massaging the back and shoulders with the serrated edge of a coin. Id.
A Mexican woman in Los Angeles was accused of child abuse, and her children were taken
away from her when she beat her 15-year-old son with a wooden spoon and bit him to punish him
for taking money from her purse. She argued that her actions were acceptable discipline in Mexico,
and she thus avoided serious penalties. She was ordered to undergo counseling. Id.
168. People v. Croy, No. 52587 (Placer County Super. Ct. Nov. 1990).
169. See supra text and accompanying notes 122-38.
170. See supra text and accompanying notes 128-35.
171. People v. Croy, No. 52587 (Placer County Super. Ct. Nov. 1990); see also J.T. Serra,
Record of Closing Argument in People v. Croy, at 21 (April 1990). Serra states: "This is a
wonderful case for justice-for you to administer justice. And the state of the facts under the state
of the law, it's your duty, it's your almost sacred duty to find "Not Guilty" on these charges". Id.
172. This defense has already been attempted. For instance, in Milwaukee, a 17-year-old girl
killed a teenage girl after stealing the victim's leather coat. The defense attorney planned to use a
"cultural psychosis" defense linking the girl's state of mind to her urban childhood experience. See
A Crime ofFashion, CHI. TRIB., January 24, 1992, at 16; Rogers Worthington, 'Cultural Psychosis'
Defense in Teen Fashion Killing, CHI. TRIB., January 19, 1992, at 19; Amy Bernstein, Eye on the
'90s, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Febnary 3, 1992, at 14.
173. See, e.g., United States v. Banks, No. 71-64SAW (N.D. Cal. 1971) (where the defendant
presented evidence of his upbringing, his problems and strengths, and historical and sociological
experience of a Black person in America).
Also, a record store owner who sold the music group 2 Live Crew's album "As Nasty As
They Wanna Be" was charged with violating obscenity laws. In arguing that 2 Live Crew's music
99 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW FALL 1994
factors may contribute to some other defense, 74 a formalized cultural
defense encompasses too broad a defendant group to have any practical
application.
Moreover, even if the cultural defense is limited to immigrants to
the United States, further problems arise as to the length of time that
they must reside in this country in order to utilize the cultural
defense.' 75 Are only recent immigrants considered? Conversely, are
foreigners fully encultured and assimilated into the culture of the United
States prohibited from arguing the defense? If the cultural defense is
adopted, the line must be drawn as to which immigrants to include within
the borders of the defense and which to exclude. Without an enunciated
standard, courts will be without direction and uncertain as to the
application of the defense. The line is a hazy one at best, and one which
may be easily moved to suit the needs of the next defendant.
Another goal of the criminal justice system is deterrence.'76 The
cultural defense would not further this goal because it provides no
deterrent effect. However, by prosecuting and punishing the defendants
involved, the notice of these consequences would send out a deterrent
signal to the whole community. For instance, when some Vietnamese
men were first prosecuted for wife-beating, they were reportedly
astounded."'7 However, as they were arrested and jailed for the crime,
"word [got] Out." 178
The deterrent aspect of the system forces other similarly situated
potential defendants to think twice before acting on their cultural
was not obscene, but based upon tradition, he presented a "cultural defense":
[T]he culture of some African-Americans growing up jobless in the socially and
economically desolate Liberty City ghetto of Miami. From a generational standpoint, 2
Live Crew reflects a culture speaking out against a long, painful, and immediate
backdrop of the "Reagan Revolution"-with all its socioeconomic, political and cultural
implications for the "black underclass" in blighted urban areas.
Robert T. Perry and Carlton Long, Obscenity Law, Hip Hop Music and 2 Live Crew, N.Y. L.J.,
July 13, 1990, at 5.
174. This defense may be encompassed in the insanity defense, mistake of fact defense, or the
diminished capacity defense. For a discussion of these alternatives to the cultural defense, see Sams,
supra note 20, at 339-45. See infra text and accompanying notes 205-23.
175. See Sams, supra note 20, at 345 (arguing that problems involve the dilemma of separating
the individual defendants who may legitimately assert the defense from those who are sufficiently
"encultured" to be held responsible for their actions); but see Cultural Defense, supra note 23 at
1310 (contending that the court may measure the defendants assimilation by factors such as: extent
of exposure to educational system, involvement with employment or other activities outside the
ethnic community, and membership in a traditional Western religion).
176. See Sams, supra note 20, at 348-50.
177. Oliver, supra note 9, at 1.
178. Id.
CULTURAL DEFENSE
impulses. 79 Unfortunately, when the cultural defense is successful,
other immigrants believe that the defense will also work for them. In the
aftermath of People v. Chen,"0 many Asian women fear for their
physical well-being and even their lives.'' One frightened Chinese
woman reportedly said, "Even thinking about it makes me afraid. My
husband has told me: 'If this is the kind of sentence you get for killing
your wife, I could do anything to you. I have the money for a good
attorney." ' Not only does the cultural defense not deter crime, it
may even encourage it.
Additionally, another compelling goal of the criminal justice system
is fairness to all who participate in the process."' 3 While the cultural
defense forges a specialized excuse for certain individuals, the majority
of defendants may not resort to this defense. They are held to the
maxim that "ignorance of the law is no excuse."" 84 In general, their
individual considerations will not exonerate them from culpability.1' 5
Other traditional defenses, such as diminished responsibility,"8 mistake
of fact," s  and insanity,"s  are available to them as equally as to
defendants from different cultures.' 89 These defenses may operate to
excuse criminal behavior or mitigate a criminal sentence for all
defendants. Accordingly, the formal recognition of a cultural defense
would be unfair to society as a whole.
179. Michael Yamaki, a third-generation Japanese-American defense lawyer, has explained that
"[s]ometimes the best education is a publicized court case .... Some of these guys get the brunt
of being educated for the benefit of the whole community." Id.
180. People v. Chen, No. 87-7774 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 21, 1989).
181. See Jetter, supra note 15, at 4.
182. Id.
183. See Sams, supra note 25, at 350-51.
184. Id. (contending that an important argument of the opponents against the cultural defense
is maintaining fairness to the majority).
185. See, e.g., Blumenthal v. United States, 88 F.2d 522, 530 (8th Cir. 1937); see also Kratz
v. Kratz, 477 F. Supp. 463, 480 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
186. See sources cited supra note 118.
187. See sources cited supra note 98.
188. The Model Penal Code definition of insanity states:
A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result
of a mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the
criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01.
Insanity may also be defined under the M'Naghten test, which requires that
[t]o establish a defense of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of
committing the act, the party accused was laboring under such a defect of reason, from
disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or if
he did know it; that he did not know what he was doing was wrong.
M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.R. 1843).
189. Sams, supra note 20, at 350-51.
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The adoption of the cultural defense would seemingly undermine
many important goals of the criminal justice system. In essence, more
problems would be created than solved. Inevitably, society must
determine if the defense even benefits the groups to whom it applies.
C. Injustice Toward Immigrant Women and Children
From the foregoing discussion, it is evident that the cultural defense
is neither a viable nor a beneficial doctrine. Although the defense
purports to protect immigrant groups whose culture affects their states of
mind, in reality, the defense only harms these groups. In fact, the
biggest furor over the Chen case came from the Asian community
itself. 11 Asian groups were rightfully angered by the court's
implication that "Asians value justice less" than Americans.' Indeed,
the loudest outcry was from the immigrant group who had the most
reason to fear the court's decision-Asian American wives." After
Chen, their husbands' violence towards them could be excused because
of the very culture of which they are a part. One battered Asian woman
stated, "What if you only get hit or beaten? If everyone thinks like this
judge, you can't get any protection." 93
In addition, a recognition of the cultural defense would demonstrate
that the United States tacitly consents to the violence toward women that
is practiced throughout the world. Other countries condone violence
toward their women.' 9  For example, Islamic countries treat the
190. See Celestine Bohlen, supra note 114, at 3.
191. Hurtado, supra note 14, at 25 (quoting Monona Yin of the Organization of Asian women).
192. See Jetter, supra note 15, at 4.
193. Id.
194. For example, genital mutilation of young girls in many African countries is a common
practice. See generally Note, What's Culture got to do with it? Excising the Harmful Tradition of
Female Circumcision, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1944 (1993). In fact, two women in France were
recently charged with child abuse for circumcising their daughters according to their traditional
custom. Ellen Goodman, A New View of Women's Lot, ATLANTA J. & CONST., March 8, 1993,
at 7. The women said they were merely abiding by the traditions of their country. A jury accepted
the cultural defense and gave the women a suspended sentence. Reena Shah Stamets, Refugees 'New
Claim: Sex Bias, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, February 25, 1993, at 14A.
In the United States, two representatives have recently introduced a Congressional bill which
would forbid operations to mutilate female genitalia. H.R. 3247, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993);
A.M. Rosenthal, Female Genital Torture, N.Y. TIMES, November 12, 1993, at AIs.
The following case is another example of how the cultural defense demonstrates the courts'
tacit consent to violence toward women. On March 29, 1993, Moosa Hanoukai, a Persian Jew,
attacked and killed his wife with a wrench after she wished death upon him and their only child.
The killing occurred on the Jewish Sabbath and the Persian New Year's Eve. In addition to
claiming that Mr. Hanoukai suffered years of mental abuse from his wife, the defense also argued
that Mr. Hanoukai was unable to escape this dysfunctional relationship because his culture and
religion prohibited divorce. The jury found him guilty of the lesser charge of voluntary
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murder of a wife less seriously than the murder of a stranger. I" In
India, many young wives are killed because of small dowries." These
women are not protected in America if a cultural defense can exculpate
their husbands.'19 Instead, these women are sacrificed to a defense
seemingly tailored toward the protection of wife-beaters and murderers.
Judge Margaret Taylor, of New York, has stated, "I'm to the point I'm
pretty fed up with excusing men's violence against women and children.
I no longer think it should be excused on a cultural basis. "1 Judicial
acceptance of a cultural defense would be disastrous for immigrant
women in the United States and that is exactly what Chen forebodes. 99
Only a small percentage of immigrant populations are protected
under a blanket cultural defense. The women are not protected from
violence, and the children are not protected from abuse' or, even,
death as in Kimura."' The cultural defense would operate to condone
human rights violations-the same violations that human rights groups
are opposing around the world.' In reality, the concept of
individualized justice is a mockery in the paradigm of a cultural defense
because for far too many individuals the result does not provide justice.
Rather, the victims do not receive their own justice, and they are
victimized a second time through the cultural defense. The defense is
illogical because it does not even protect the entire group of immigrants
that is deemed worthy of protection.
Therefore, the cultural defense does not seem to be viable in light
of the practical considerations and goals of the criminal justice system.
manslaughter, rather than second degree murder, a charge that carries a maximum sentence of'12
years imprisonment. See Thorn Mrozek, Jury finds Wife Killer Acted in Heat of Passion, L.A.
TIMEs, March 26, 1994, at B1.
195. Spatz, supra note 34, at 597. For a comparative study on how different countries abuse
their women, see generally Spatz, supra note 34.
196. Id. at 607-13 (describing the phenomenon of "dowry deaths" in India).
197. For more on the feminist perspective on the acceptance of violence toward women around
the world, see Charlotte Grimes, Women Press U.N. On Rights, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, June
3, 1993, at IC; Kathleen Hendrix, World's Women Speak As One Against Abuse; Strategy: From
Fiji to Israel, Uganda to the U.S., Activists Raise A New Battle Cry-Treat Violence Against Women
As a Violation of Basic Human Rights, L.A. TIMES, May 27, 1991, at El; Cathy Young, Feminists'
Multicultural Dilemma, CHI. TRIB., July 8, 1992, at 15.
198. DeBenedictis, supra note 20, at 28.
199. Holly Maguigon, a law professor at New York University, pressed colleagues about the
meaning of the cultural defense. She said their response was unanimous: "That's what makes men
feel it's okay to kill their wives." Jetter, supra note 15, at 4.
200. Many countries consider unnecessary corporal punishment to be an acceptable form of
disciplining children.
201. People v. Kimura, No. A-091133 (Santa Monica Super. Ct. Nov. 21, 1989).
202. See Goodman, supra note 195, at 7; see also Hendrix, supra note 198, at El; see also
Grimes, supra note 198, at IC.
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While in theory, the defense would appear to protect individualized
justice and cultural pluralism, in essence, it strips these values of their
integrity and protects no one.
Despite the fact that the defense appears to be neither viable nor
beneficial, proponents of the defense argue a similarity to other
recognized and accepted state of mind defenses. 23  Because the
criminal justice system includes these defenses, they contend that a
cultural defense should likewise be approved. In order to fully evaluate
the viability of the cultural defense, the proceeding section addresses
these contentions.
VI. Comparison to Other State of Mind Defenses
Many proponents of the cultural defense liken it to the battered
woman syndrome or the Vietnam veteran defense.' Each of these
defenses pertain to the actor's state of mind when the crime was
committed, and the defenses work to mitigate criminal responsibility.
They also apply to the mens rea element or intent to perform some
criminal act.
Battered woman syndrome has been defined as "a series of common
characteristics that appear in women who are abused physically and
psychologically over an extended period of time by the dominant male
figure in their lives."' Usually, the testimony is presented at trial
when the battered woman claims she maimed or killed her mate in self-
defense.' Vietnam veteran defenses are also presented as testimony
in trials where a defendant claims that his capacity for understanding his
criminal actions has been reduced due to his participation in the Vietnam
war.' This excuse has been classified under a broad umbrella defense
called the "post traumatic stress disorder" defense. 8 Courts generally
203. See Jetter, supra note 15, at 4.
204. Id. (stating that some argue that "the cultural defense has a rightful place alongside legal
strategies used by battered women and Vietnam veterans-namely that their expectations may twist
their views of immediate danger and the necessity to kill").
205. State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 371 (N.J. 1984); see also Note, Developments in the
Law-Legal Responses To Domestic Violence: Part V. Battered Women Who Kill Their Abusers, 106
HARV. L. REv. 1574 (1993) [hereinafter Battered Women].
206. See David L. Faigman, The Battered Woman Syndrome and Self-Defense: A Legal and
Empirical Dissent, 72 VA. L. REv. 619 (1986).
207. See Commonwealth v. Vanderpool, 328 N.E.2d 833 (Mass. 1975) (Vietnam veteran fled
scene of shooting when he imagined himself back in Vietnam); Kemp v. State, 211 N.W.2d 793
(Wis. 1973) (Vietnam veteran shot wife while dreaming he was being attacked by Viet Cong);
People v. Lisnow, 151 Cal. Rptr. 621 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (Vietnam veteran attempted to explain
unprovoked attack on maitre d' by claiming a lapse of memory and dream-like experiences of
Vietnam).
208. See Michael J. Davidson, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder: A Controversial Defense For
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accept the testimony pertaining to these psychological disorders, and
defendants often receive reduced sentences or verdicts of "not
guilty. "I
Both of these defenses are accepted psychological syndromes in the
psychiatric community." ° Both are the result of painstaking research
over many years, and most courts willingly permit psychiatrists and
psychologists to testify at trial on the effects of these syndromes on the
accused's state of mind.2 ' In comparison, the cultural defense is not
a psychiatric diagnosis. Science and scientific evidence do not serve as
the foundation for determining state of mind with regard to the cultural
defense. Rather, testimony referring to one's culture relates to social
mores as opposed to psychological processes. Social science is often
inaccurate and subjective in character."
The problems created in presenting anthropological science as expert
testimony can be evidenced in the Chen2 3 case.2 14  The expert who
testified in the case, an anthropologist at an American college, stated that
adultery makes Chinese men more prone to violence. 2t5  However,
several Chinese organizations criticized the decision, asserting that
adultery is not a justification for killing in modern China.2"6 They
called the court's thinking patriarchal and archaic.217 In retrospect,
Veterans of A Controversial War, 29 WM. & MARY L. REv. 415 (1988).
209. Vietnam War Trauma Grows as Defense in Criminal Cases, L.A. DAILY J., May 27, 1985,
at 1 (claiming that [i]n its first five years of use, the [post traumatic stress disorder] defense has
helped at least 250 Vietnam veterans get shorter sentences, treatment instead of jail, or acquittals);
see also Faigman, supra note 207, at 619.
210. See Burke, The "Bombshell" Defense, NAT'L L.J., May 12, 1980, at 1; see also Battered
Women, supra note 208, at 1585 n.76 (citing the Brief of Amicus Curiae of the American
Psychological Association in State v. Kelly, which stated that the battered woman syndrome is
accepted by the scientific community).
211. The Federal Rules of Evidence provide guidance as to exactly what sort of testimony may
be presented. They provide, in relevant part, that
[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form
of an opinion or otherwise.
FED. R. EVID. 702.
212. See, e.g., Greely, Debunking the Role of Social Scientists in Court, HUM. RTS. Q., Spring
1978, at 34.
213. People v. Chen, No. 87-7774 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 21, 1989).
214. See supra text and accompanying notes 105-21.
215. He stated, "I didn't know how it was going to work out. I was asked very specific
questions: 'Is adultery going to make a Chinese man more prone to violence?' And I said 'yes'."
Jetter, supra note 15, at 4.
216. Hurtado, supra note 14, at 17.
217. Id.; see also Bohlen, supra note 114, at 3.
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social science did not offer a correct cultural representation in the Chen
case.
Primarily, social scientists provide information concerning the
general characteristics of a culture. 218 However, it is nearly impossible
to state with accuracy the mindset of every person who comes from a
certain culture. A jury may be unable to determine an individual's state
of mind rather than the collective culture's psyche.219  The evidence
presented would therefore tend to focus on general culture as opposed to
the specific defendant's values.
Furthermore, the experts who present this testimony are sometimes
not even members of the culture. Yet, they are evaluating the culture's
values. It is thus inevitable that many experts will express differing or
possibly inaccurate views based upon their own subjective study. There
may not be any single standard for determining what is generally
accepted in a given culture. One expert may relate that a certain value
permeates a culture, while another may disagree due to his own personal
observances.
Although psychiatric testimony also leaves room for subjective
analysis, there are certain standards recognized in the psychiatric
community. Both the Vietnam veteran's defense and the battered spouse
defense are recognized throughout the community, studied extensively,
and quantifiably documented.' Because cultural customs and people's
mindsets are continuously in flux, a culture's "values" are not readily
quantifiable or easily studied. Therefore, testimony of culture may not
be as reliable or accurate as that presented in the other state of mind
defenses.
A further problem arises, again, as to whom the cultural defense
pertains." Battered woman defenses apply to a readily identifiable
group-battered women. Likewise, the Vietnam veteran defense applies
only to veterans of the Vietnam war. Even post traumatic stress disorder
defenses apply only to victims of a stressful event like rape, fire, flood,
218. For example, Burton Pasternak, the anthropologist who testified in the Chen case,
specializes in Chinese social customs. Jetter, supra note 15, at 4. Even so, he would not be able
to recount the moral values and traditions of every Chinese person living in China today.
219. The consequence of focusing on a defendant's culture as a defense is that the culture would
be essentially subjected to scrutiny at trial. Instead of focusing on an individual's blameworthiness,
the defense would force a judgment about the alien culture. The inquiry may tend to concentrate
on the validity of the cultural values and customs as opposed to the defendant's guilt. See Lyman,
supra note 1, at 92.
220. See, e.g., Walker, The Psychological Problems of Vietnam Veterans 246 JAMA 781
(1981).
221. See supra text and accompanying notes 167-76.
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or war.' In each of these defenses, there is no potential for an
unrecognized, unidentified group attempting to assert the defense.
However, as the cultural defense could literally be applied to everyone,
there is nothing to stop every defendant from attempting to utilize the
defense. This could then undermine the integrity of the criminal justice
system, and would cause utter chaos in the courts. In order to properly
assert any defense, there must be a discernible, numbered group to
whom the defense will pertain.
It is evident that the other state of mind defenses differ
fundamentally from the proposed cultural defense. While the previous
defenses have proven to be worthy in the presentation of trial testimony,
the cultural defense cannot be adequately offered as a reliable doctrine.
A comparison to other defenses is futile because the cultural defense does
not appear feasible in light of the potential evidentiary difficulties.
Because a recognition of the cultural defense is not viable, beneficial, or
sufficiently related to other state of mind defenses, it should not be
formally adopted into a recognized legal doctrine.
VII. Conclusion
Because of the ever increasing number of immigrants in this
country, there is likely to be more frequent clashes of culture in the
future.' The forerunning cases which have already considered
cultural factors provide the forum for the debate as to whether the
cultural defense should be an accepted defense in criminal law. While
none of these cases present a pure cultural defense, all show the
ambivalence of the courts in recognizing the formal defense. The
criminal justice goals of individualized justice and cultural pluralism may
be upheld if a formal defense is available. Nevertheless, other
compelling goals such as deterrence and fairness might then be
compromised. Additionally, the defense is not viable due to the potential
slippery slope involved in addressing defendant groups. More
importantly, the defense only harms the very groups it purports to
protect. A recognized defense provides a justifiable excuse for violence
against immigrant women and children. The cultural defense can also be
readily distinguished from other acknowledged and approved state of
mind defenses. A comparison to these defenses is therefore unjustified.
Perhaps the strongest defense still lies within the traditional defenses in
the criminal justice system, with a sympathetic prosecutor and an
222. Davidson, supra note 209, at 421.
223. Sherman, supra note 3, at 26.
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equitable judge.' Through this medium, individualized justice will
be served, and uniform justice will not be sacrificed. Accordingly,
ignorance of the law will continue to be no excuse, and the culturally
diverse will be held to an appropriate level of culpability in conformity
with the moral standards set by the majority.
Taryn F. Goldstein
224. See Lyman, supra note 1, at 117.
